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Abstract 
Given conflicting results on whether the US monetary policy rule exhibited nonlinearity in the post-war period we 
employ a new Granger non-causality nonlinearity test and non-parametric procedures to re-examine the issue. Both 
procedures suggest that the Fed followed a nonlinear Taylor rule with respect to expected inflation and expected 
output gap prior to 1979 but not post 1982.
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1.  Introduction 
  Recently, Péguin-Feissolle, Strikholm and Teräsvirta (2008) (PST) have provided a 
new  test  for  nonlinear  causality.  Our  purpose  in  this  paper  is  to  employ  their  test  in 
conjunction  with  others,  particularly  a  non-parametric  method,  in  a  further  analysis  of 
whether the US Taylor rule exhibits nonlinearity. This seems worthwhile given that previous 
literature  has  reported  contradictory  results.  Since  Clarida  et  al.  (2000)  reported  linear 
estimates  of  Taylor  rules  in  the  US,  a  number  of  papers,  motivated  by  the  research  on 
asymmetric preferences or opportunistic behavior of policy makers (e.g. Cukierman 2002, 
Orphanides and Wieland 2000, and Orphanides 2003), have reported evidence of nonlinearity 
in the response of interest rates to its assumed determinants
1. However, the reported results 
are contradictory. For example, Kim et al. (2005, 1960:I-2000:IV) found nonlinearity in both 
expected  inflation  and  expected  output  prior  to  1979  but  linear  thereafter.  Surico  (2007, 
1960:I-2003:II) obtained evidence of nonlinearity only in expected output up to 1983 and 
linear  thereafter.  Cukierman  and  Muscatelli  (2002,  1979:III-1999:IV,  and  2008,  1960:I-
2005:IV) reported nonlinearity with respect to expected inflation and expected output, except 
in  the  Paul  Volcker  period,  whilst  Dolado  et  al.  (2004,  1970:M1-2000:M12)  found 
nonlinearity in expected inflation only since 1983. 
  We consider the properties of the Taylor rule over a sample period longer that the 
ones  employed  by  previous  researchers,  1960:I  to  1979:II  and  1982:IV  to  2008:IV. 
Furthermore, given the promising results of Kim et al. (2005), we employ non-parametric 
regressions in order to determine whether there is graphical evidence of non-linear (or linear) 
behavior consistent with the PST test. Essentially, results of both methods support significant 
nonlinearity in the Taylor Rule in the period up to 1979 but not in the period since 1983. This 
nonlinearity  is  apparently  parsimoniously  captured  by  the  hyperbolic  tangent  smooth 
transition  regression  (HTSTR)  model  proposed  by  Cukierman  and  Muscatelli  (2002  and 
2008).  The  standard  errors  and  critical  values  of  the  HTSTR  estimated  parameters  are 
obtained  employing  a  block  bootstrap  methodology  in  order  to  deal  with  possible  serial 
correlation and identification issues.  
  The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the Granger non-causality 
nonlinearity  test  and  present  their  results.  In  section  3,  we  spell  out  our  non-parametric 
procedures and show plots of the partial derivatives of interest rates to expected inflation and 
expected output. Section 4 reports estimates of the policy rule based on the HTSTR model 
proposed  by  Cukierman  and  Muscatelli  (2002  and  2008).  This  appears  to  capture 
parsimoniously the nonlinearity in the first period of our sample. The paper concludes with a 
brief summary in section 5.  
 
2.  Granger Non-causality Nonlinearity Test Framework and Nonlinear Test 
  Our data is quarterly from 1960:I to 2008:IV and we consider two sample periods, 
1960:I  to  1979:II  and  1982:IV  to  2008:IV.  We  exclude  the  period  between  1979:III  and 
1982:III because the monetary procedures were largely different from before and after that 
period.  In  particular,  it  is  acknowledged  that  the  Federal  Reserve  targeted  non-borrowed 
reserves rather than short-term interest rates from 1979:IV to 1982:III. Inflation is measured 
                                                             
1 We note the important contribution of Minford et al. (2002) which shows that estimates of the response of 
interest rates to expected inflation and output may not be the policy rule followed by the central bank but rather 
observationally  equivalent  to  a  money  supply  rule.  Also  the  important  contribution  of  Cochrane  (2007) 
demonstrates that identification of a Taylor rule may not be feasible in certain model structures. From both 
perspectives our results could be interpreted as evidence of linearity or nonlinearity in the reduced form rather 
than the Taylor rule per-se. 2 
 
as the annualised rate of change of the GDP deflator (￿￿) between two subsequent quarters: 
￿￿ ￿ 400 ￿ ￿ln￿￿￿￿ ￿ ln￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.  The  output  gap  measure  (xt)  is  100  times  the  difference 
between the logarithms of real GDP and the estimate for potential real GDP constructed by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The interest rate is the average Federal Funds rates 
in the first month of each quarter. All these series were downloaded from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. We obtain expected inflation and expected output gap using the same 
method  and  instruments  as  Kim  et  al.  (2005).
2  In  particular,  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  and  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ where ￿￿￿ and ￿ ￿￿ denote four quarter moving average of current and previous 
interest and inflation rates, and we assume horizons for inflation and output gap as ￿ ￿   ￿ 1 
following Clarida et al. (2000) and Kim et al. (2005). 
 
2.1 Granger Non-causality Nonlinearity Framework-PST TEST 
We have two time series { ￿￿} and { #￿} between which the functional form of the 
relationship is unknown, but it is assumed that the possible causal relationship between them 
is adequately represented by the following equation 
 
 #￿ ￿ $ %& #￿￿￿,(, #￿￿), ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿*;,- ￿ .￿,          (1) 
 
Where , is  a  parameter  vector  and .￿~012￿0,3￿￿.  In  this  framework, ￿ does  not 
Granger cause y if 
 
$ %& #￿￿￿,(, #￿￿), ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿￿*;,- ￿ $￿￿ #￿￿￿,(, #￿￿);,￿￿      (2) 
 
This means that the conditional mean of  #￿ is not a function of past values of  ￿￿ . Given that 
the functional form of $ % is unknown, by linearising $ % with a Taylor series approximation, 
we obtain the following form, 
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6:=￿ ￿ >?@A10B                                                              (3) 
 
Expansion (3) contains combinations of lagged values of { #￿} and C ￿￿D. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis ￿7 ￿ ￿7 ￿ 0   implies  ￿￿ nonlinearly  Granger  causes #￿.  We  employ  two  lags  of 
both expected inflation and expected output gap for testing the null hypothesis in our Granger 
non-causality nonlinearity test, 
 
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ E￿1￿￿￿ ￿ E￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ 
                     ￿￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ 
                     ￿ ￿F1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ 
    ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ .￿  (4) 
 
where 1￿ is Federal Funds rates, ￿￿￿< and ￿￿￿< are expected inflation and expected output gap.  
 
                                                             
2 Kim et al. (2005) employed instruments dated at time t. We also obtained results using that information set 
which are quantitatively similar but prefer those dated t-1 to ensure orthogonality to the disturbance term.  3 
 
  The results of the PST test reported in Table 1 reject the null of a linear model in the 
period up to 1979 but not in the period since 1983. These results are validated by a number of 
alternative tests which provide further support for the nonlinearity in the first period but not 
in  the  second  one.  One  is  the  non-parametric  test  based  on  Hsiao  et  al.  (2007),  which 
employs  kernel  functions  and  smoothers  using  least  squares  cross-validation.  The  other 
nonlinear  tests  are  the  residual-based  test  of  Cukierman  and  Muscatelli  (2002)  and  the 
Ramsey Reset test. 
 
3.  Non-parametric Analysis 
3.1 Non-parametric Procedures 
We  complement  the  previous  results  of  the  nonlinearity  tests  employing  a  non-
parametric regression to determine whether there is any evidence of an obvious parametric 
nonlinear  shape.  We  employ  the  non-parametric  package  of  Hayfield  and  Racine  (2009) 
which enables us to plot the partial derivatives  of interest rates with respect to expected 
inflation and expected output gap (including lagged interest rate terms) without establishing 
specific  functional  forms  between  parameters  and  variables.  This  software  is  easy  to 
implement relative to the non-parametric random field estimator of Hamilton (2001) which 
was a novelty employed by Kim et al. (2005) in this setting.  
 
A regression equation is expressed as, 
 
  G H ￿ @￿IH￿ ￿ .H,                  (5) 
 
we can specify the conditional mean of G H as, 
 




O￿P￿           (6) 
 
where $￿￿,#￿ denotes the joint density function of IH and G H and $￿￿￿ denotes the marginal 
density function of  IH. The non-parametric kernel regression is based on locally weighted 
averages of the equation (6)’s numerator and denominator, and it can be formulated as  
 
 @ RS￿￿￿ ￿
TU: ∑ VWXY￿ZW￿P￿ [
W\:




H=￿ ￿￿￿ · G H                        (7) 
 
where ￿S￿·￿ denotes a kernel density with a bandwidth of  ^, and ]SH￿￿￿ ￿
TU:·XY￿ZW￿P￿
O _Y￿P￿  are 
normalised  weights  for  each  G H  value  (Härdle,  1990).  By  employing  cross  validated 
bandwidth selection and second order Gaussian kernel we estimate the following model, 
 
 1￿ ￿ `￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿, 1￿￿￿, 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ .￿            (8) 
 
where 1￿ is  Federal  Funds  rates, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿￿￿ are  expected  inflation  and  expected 
output gap, respectively. After estimating the partial derivatives of interest rates with respect 
to expected inflation and expected output gap, we calculate error bounds by bootstrap with 





3.2 Non-parametric Results: Plots of the Partial Derivatives 
  Figures 1, and 2 plot the gradients of the Fed’s reaction function to expected inflation 
and expected output gap for the pre and post Volcker period; 1960:I-1979:II and 1982:IV-
2008:IV.  Figure  1(a)  is  suggestive  that  the  response  to  expected  inflation  increased  with 
expected inflation and is more marked when expected inflation exceeded 3%. However, since 
the reported bootstrap confidence gets wider as the rate of inflation increases we may not 
conclude that there is a nonlinear relationship between interest rates and expected inflation 
based solely on this graph. However, in conjunction with the formal nonlinearity tests, a 
parametric formulation which captures the plot form seems warranted. Figure 1(b) presents a 
more clear-cut suggestion. The response to the output gap was seemingly more pronounced 
for negative rather than positive gaps, which suggests that the Fed was more concerned about 
recessions than expansions in the 1960s and 1970s.  
In  the  period  since  1983  the  gradient  of  the  Fed’s  interest  response  to  expected 
inflation shown in Figure 2(a) is essentially flat suggesting that, on average, the response to 
inflation in the second period is linear. The gradient of interest rates to expected output gap in 
Figure  2(b)  decreases  but  the  slope  became  relatively  flatter  after  zero.  However,  as  the 
confidence intervals of the output gap are much wider, until output gap of zero, the nonlinear 
pattern is clearly much less reliable and consistent with the statistical tests. 
 
4.  Nonlinear Taylor Rules 
4.1 Nonlinear Taylor Rule Estimates 
 
  Based on our non-parametric figures, we formulate the US monetary policymakers’ 
reaction function. We employ a smooth transition model to estimate the US monetary policy 
reaction function. In particular, we utilize the hyperbolic tangent smooth transition regression 
(HTSTR) model (Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2002 and 2008), namely, 
 
  1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿tanhJde￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿L ￿
                      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿tanhJdP￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿L ￿ E￿1￿￿￿ ￿ E￿1￿￿￿ ￿ .￿        (9) 
 
where d denotes the degree of nonlinearity. The presence of the nonlinearity in the monetary 
policy can be verified by conducting the hypothesis test that ￿￿ or ￿￿ is equal to zero. We 
assume d is 0.2, the same as in Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008), and the threshold value for 
inflation  and  output  gap  as  3%  and  zero,  respectively,  representing  our  non-parametric 
results.  These  numbers  were  obtained  by  grid  search  in  which  the  model  with  the  least 
information criterion, e.g. AIC, is selected. The t-statistics of the coefficients on the nonlinear 
variables; expected inflation (￿￿) and expected output (￿￿￿, were obtained using a block 
bootstrap procedure with 999 repetitions since there is evidence of significant residual serial 
correlation. We choose a block size of 7 following Patton et al. (2009).
3 
Table 2 reports the results of the HTSTR model for the two sub periods; 1960:I-
1979:II and 1982:IV-2008:IV
4,5. We note that, in column 2, the coefficients of ￿￿ is well over 
the conventional 5% significant level based on standard t-statistics but is significant only at 
the 5% level based on the block bootstrap t-statistics. The other nonlinear parameter, ￿￿, is 
                                                             
3 We also tried the block bootstrap with block size of 4, and the results were qualitatively similar to the ones 
reported with block size 7. 
4 We also employed a GMM estimation, and the results were qualitatively similar to the nonlinear regression. 
5 We find only nonlinearity in expected output gap prior to 1979 using the quadratic reaction function (Surico, 
2007). 5 
 
strongly significant on both metrics. These results imply that the Fed’s reaction function is 
nonlinear with respect to expected inflation and expected output in the former period. In 
particular,  the  positive  sign  on ￿￿ implies  that  the  interest  rate  response  to  inflation  gets 
stronger as inflation rises. On the other hand, the Fed response to a negative output gap is 
more aggressive than to a positive gap as evidenced by the negative coefficient of ￿￿. The 
hyperbolic functions for these values are plotted in Figure 3. The changing slope is indicative 
of high inflation and recession avoidance preferences of the Fed (Cukierman and Muscatelli 
2008,  and  Surico  2007).  These  findings  are  in  line  with  the  non-parametric  evidence 
presented in Figure 1 above.  
Finally,  the  results  in  the  later  period  shown  in  column  3  indicate  that  the  US 
monetary authority followed a linear Taylor rule, which is compatible with the findings of 
Kim et al. (2005) and Surico (2007). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Reported results on the relationship between interest rates and expected inflation and 
expected output gap in post-war US data are contradictory. Employing the recently proposed 
test for nonlinear causality of Péguin-Feissolle, Strikholm and Teräsvirta (2008) (PST) and 
also the relatively easy to implement non-parametric package of Hayfield and Racine (2009) 
we  re-examine  the  nonlinearity  in  the  US  monetary  policy  rule  over  the  periods  1960:I-
1979:II and 1982:IV-2008:IV. Results of the PST and other linearity tests strongly suggest a 
nonlinear relationship in the period up to 1979 and a linear relationship in the period since 
1982. The hyperbolic tangent smooth transition regression (HTSTR) model of Cukierman 
and Muscatelli (2002 and 2008) appears to capture the nonlinearity in the first period, where 
the  Fed  seems  to  react  more  aggressively  the  higher  the  inflation  rate  and  has  a  more 
aggressive response to a recession rather than to a boom. Meanwhile, the promising result 
using the PST test in the US nonlinear monetary policy suggests further potential applications 
in areas such as the relationship between real exchange rates and its equilibrium determinants 
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Table 1. Test of Nonlinearity 
 
 





￿H ￿ ￿6 ￿ 0  ￿H ￿ ￿6 ￿ 0 
8.71(0.00)*  1.30(0.25) 
Non-parametric test 
 (Hsiao et al., 2007)  2.66(0.00)*  0.29(0.16) 
Cukierman and 
Muscatelli (2002)
b  ￿￿ ￿ 0  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0  ￿￿ ￿ 0  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 
f￿Q ￿ 10$gA<1h0  2.76(0.04)*  3.88(0.00)*  1.49(0.21)  1.81(0.09) 
f￿Q ￿ hi<￿i< jA￿  0.42(0.80)  3.94(0.00)*  0.25(0.91)  0.27(0.97) 
Ramsey Reset(2)  10.04(0.00)*  2.39(0.10) 
Notes: a. 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ E￿1￿￿￿ ￿ E￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ 
                                ￿￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ 
                                ￿ ￿F1￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ 
                                ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿C￿￿￿D￿￿￿ ￿ .￿, 
H0 : ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿F ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0. 




￿I￿￿f￿Q￿￿,￿￿ ￿ 0,￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 
where f￿Q is the transition variable. 
P-values are in parenthesis. An asterisk (*) indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level. 
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Table 2. Results of Hyperbolic Tangent Smooth Transition Regression 
 
 
  1960:I-1979:II  1982:IV-2008:IV 
￿  0.806  -0.177 
  (0.196)*  (0.335) 
￿￿  0.206  0.253 
  (0.081)*  (0.103)* 
￿￿  0.247  0.107 
  (0.061)*  (0.041)* 
￿￿  0.272  -0.040 
                                      (0.155)  (0.529) 
                                      [0.049]*  [0.455] 
￿￿  -0.231  -0.081 
                                     (0.117)*  (0.054) 
                                      [0.026]*  [0.106] 
E￿  0.883  1.327 
  (0.113)*  (0.138)* 
E￿  -0.247  -0.406 
  (0.110)*  (0.128)* 
l ￿￿  0.903  0.965 
BG(4)  4.45(0.00)  1.76(0.14) 
ARCH(1)  17.32(0.00)  6.62(0.01) 
JB  37.71(0.00)  8.09(0.02) 
Note : Newey-West standard errors are in parenthesis and P-values for Block bootstrap errors are in brackets. 
An asterisk (*) denotes significance at 5%. BG(4) is the Breuch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation 
up to order 4 and associated p-value. ARCH(1) is the F-statistics and associated P-value for Arch of 
order 1. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality and associated P-value. 
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Figure 1. The Gradients of the Fed’s Reaction Function (1960:I-1979:II) 
 
 
                         Note : The solid line represent the gradients of the Fed’s reaction function and the dotted lines 
are error bounds calculated by bootstrap resampling  399 times. 
 
   
















































Figure 1. The Gradients of the Fed’s Reaction Function (1960:I-1979:II, Continued) 
 
 
                         Note : The solid line represent the gradients of the Fed’s reaction function and the dotted lines 
are error bounds calculated by bootstrap resampling  399 times. 
 
   






























































Figure 2. The Gradients of the Fed’s Reaction Function (1982:IV-2008: IV)  
 
                         Note : The solid lines represent the gradients of the Fed’s reaction function  and the dotted lines 
are error bounds calculated by bootstrap resampling  399 times. 












































Figure 2. The Gradients of the Fed’s Reaction Function (1982:IV-2008: IV, Continued)  
 
 
                         Note : The solid lines represent the gradients of the Fed’s reaction function  and the dotted lines 
are error bounds calculated by bootstrap resampling  399 times. 
 
 
   













































Figure 3. The Hyperbolic Tangent Function (1960:I-1979:II) 
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